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How Active are Active Managers? 
 
This paper seeks to provide a balanced perspective on the role that benchmarks play in the 
setting of investment policy, the degree to which asset managers deviate from these bench-
marks in pursuit of adding value and the degree to which value is added. 
 
The findings of this occasional paper are also helpful in understanding the role that a  
quantitative manager fulfils and the degree to which quantitative  
and active judgemental asset managers should be viewed  
as having complimentary skills in the establishment 
of optimal fund structures and prudent 
investment policy 
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Do active managers add any value and if so why 
should anyone consider using a passive ap-
proach in considering how best to manage a 
pension fund? 
 
The answer depends to an extent on who has 
asked the question and what is to be gained from 
the answer. Many participants in the retirement 
fund industry have set about trying to prove that 
an active approach is better than a more passive 
approach and vice versa. The view is often ex-
pressed, for example, that over 90% of any pen-
sion fund’s return is based on the asset alloca-
tion decision.  The logical, yet erroneous conclu-
sion drawn, is that active managers are not able 
to add any meaningful return through stock se-
lection and, as such, a substantial portion of all 
the time and energy spent in managing a fund 
should be focussed on the asset allocation deci-
sion. The argument is further advanced by sug-
gesting that a significant portion of any portfolio 
should be passively managed against a bench-
mark that focuses primarily on ensuring the cor-
rect allocation to each asset class. These are 
clearly arguments developed to promote a spe-
cific asset management style.  
 
 
The Role of Trustees 
The primary role that any trustee has to fulfil is 
that of ensuring that the funds entrusted to them 
are managed in accordance with the investment 
objectives and risk constraints of the members. 
In addressing this issue a range of alternatives 
have been offered by the asset management 
industry that, in general, seek to guide trustees in 
the appropriate choice of strategic policy. Funds 
are typically categorised as low, medium or high 
risk with underlying benchmarks for each risk 
category. Asset managers are mandated to 
manage the assets of the fund against the stated 
benchmark and are required to add incremental 
levels of return. A low risk fund would have a 
much lower tolerance of negative returns relative 
to the benchmark portfolio than would a high risk 
fund. Looked at from a different perspective, one 
would generally expect the return profile for a low 
risk fund to be less volatile than a typical pension 
fund or high risk fund over time.  
 
In order to gain some insight into how pension 
funds are managed in relation to their respective 
mandates, and the degree to which active re-
turns are generated, three key questions need to 
be raised, namely: 
1.  How much of the variability of returns 
across time is explained by policy? In other 
words, how much of the ups and downs of 
a typical pension fund’s total return (TRi) is 
explained by the benchmark return (BRi)? 
2.  When trustees establish a policy or bench-
mark for their fund, how similar is this policy 
to those set by other trustees? 
3.  In assigning a mandate to an asset man-
ager, how are asset managers positioning 
the actual fund relative to the benchmark 
and how much value is being added by the 
asset manager? 
 
Much of the controversy relating to the issue of 
how much value asset managers add to any 
given benchmark is as a direct result of confu-




The data used in the study consisted of the 
monthly returns for each of the country’s top 10 
pension fund managers as reported in the Alex-
ander Forbes Survey of Large Managers (Global 
Balanced Mandates) dating back to October 
1995. Although no data is supplied in the surveys 
as to the number of funds represented, it is ac-
knowledged that all unrestricted balanced man-
dates are entered by each asset manager as part 
of their survey submission. Dispersion of returns 
around the mean are  reported which enabled us 
to consider whether this dispersion was material 
in terms of differences in underlying mandate. 
This was not the case and therefore the basis of 
the study incorporates all pension funds man-
aged by the top 10 managers in conformity with a 
balanced mandate— i.e. a typical pension fund. 
 
The first step in analysing the data was to decom-
pose the total return, TR, of each managers 
return into two components, policy return and 
active return, as follows: 
 
Where 
  TRi,t    =  total return of fund i for period t 
  BRi,t   =  benchmark return of fund i for period t 
  ARi,t   =  active return of fund i for period t 
 
Benchmark return is that part of the total return 
that results from the asset allocation policy set by 
the trustees. In simple terms, this is the bench-
mark set by the trustees, and where no bench-
mark is set, the implied benchmark is that of an 
industry median return. 
 
Active returns constitute the difference between 
what the fund has actually achieved and the 
benchmark return. These returns depend on the 
decisions taken by the asset manager in terms of 
actively over or under-weighting various asset 
classes / sectors, stock selection decision and 
the magnitude and timing of those decisions. 
 
In our time series analysis (questions 1 & 3) we 
used period-by-period returns. In the cross-
sectional analysis, we used the compound annual 
rates of return over the period. In all instances we 
used the benchmark returns as supplied by the 
asset managers on the understanding that these 
benchmark returns reflected the aggregate re-
turns of the benchmarks against which funds 





 The pension fund industry has, for many years focused on selecting asset managers 
on the basis of the manager(s) that have outperformed over periods ranging from 
one to three years. In doing so, sight has been lost of the value added through 
this selection process. 
 
In order for the industry to be able to move forward, particularly in light of the  
proposed changes to Regulation 28 of the Pension Funds Act, a framework 
of understanding is required. This paper takes the first step in that direction. 




uestion 1 was the subject  of a 
comprehensive study by Gary Brin-
son et al.,  in 1986 with a follow up 
in 1991. Brinson studied quarterly 
returns for 91 large US Pension Funds from 
1974-83 and in the second study from 1978—
87 for 82 funds. The primary focus of both 
studies was to determine how much of the 
variability of each pension fund’s actual return 
was explained by that fund’s policy or bench-
mark return. Both studies did this by regressing 
each funds total return (TRi,t) against its policy 
return (BRi,t). Brinson then examined the aver-
age, median and distribution of these results. In 
the first study Brinson et al. concluded that the 
average R2 was 93.6% and in the second study 
91.5%. Based on these results the authors 
concluded that more than 90% of the variability  
of the average pension fund’s return over a 
period of time is explained by the benchmark or 
policy set for that fund. This measure is dis-
tinctly different from the question as to how 
much return is derived from the asset allocation 
decision. Unfortunately this point is not well 
understood by the market as one often hears 
the quote “over 90% of a funds return is deter-
mined by the asset allocation decision”, which 
is clearly incorrect. 
 
In reviewing the analysis of the domestic pen-
sion fund industry we concluded that the R2 for 
the average domestic pension fund that forms 
part of the sample set is 97.4% (figure 1). A 
comparison between this analysis and the 
international perspective is set out in table 1. 
 
These results confirm, in aggregate, the find-
ings of previous studies that approximately 
90% plus of the variability of a funds return 
across time is explained by the variability of the 
benchmark or policy return. Yet this conclusion 
is only partially useful since it does not show 
the range of outcomes of the study. These are 
reflected in table 2. 
 
As can be seen from table 2, those managers 
in the top 5th percentile only had 65% of their 
variability of returns explained by the variability 
of the benchmark whereas funds in the 25th to 
95th percentile were in a much tighter range. 
 
The analysis, therefore, suggests that there are 
selected managers that deviate quite substan-
tially from both fund benchmarks and industry 
norms in pursuit of generating active returns. 
The greater part of the industry, however, does 
not. In fact the study would indicate that the 
domestic pension fund industry clusters ex-
tremely closely, resulting in a very high propor-
tion of the variability of actual returns being 
attributable to benchmark returns. Part of the 
explanation for the very high R2’s is also partly 
due to the fact that all pension funds are 
broadly invested in the same markets within a 
very narrow range of exposures. Underlying 
movements in the equity, bond, and interna-
tional markets therefore have a material impact 




uestion 2 looks to establish how 
much the variation in returns among 
funds is explained by differences in 
policy. By way of example, if all 
funds in the industry followed that same invest-
ment policy and each fund was managed ex-
actly in accordance with that benchmark portfo-
lio then all funds would be exactly the same. 
The R- squared would accordingly be 1.  
 
Our analysis took the form of a cross-sectional 
regression of compound 5-year returns  be-
tween each fund’s total return, TRi, and the 
corresponding 5-year compound return for 
each fund’s benchmark return, BRi. The R2 of 
this regression showed that 43.8% (figure 2) of 
the return differences was explained by the 
policy decision. The Ibbotson study in the US 
generated an R2 of 35%. In our study we noted 
that the cross-sectional R2 depended on both 
the difference in investment policy and the 
degree to which funds engaged in active man-
agement strategies.  
 
To establish the degree to which active man-
agement strategies affected the cross-sectional 
R2 we computed the impact of different levels 
of active management on the R2. The results of 
this study are reflected in figure 3 which shows 
the R2 that results from regressing the modified 
compound annual returns on compound annual 
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Figure 1:  Time-Series regression of monthly Fund Returns vs Benchmark  Returns:   
Domestic Pension Fund Average 1995 to 2001 
Study  R Squared 
Brinson 1986  93.6% 
Brinson 1991  91.5% 
Ibbotson et al. 2000  90.7% 
SA Pension Funds*  97.4% 
Percen-
tile 
Ibbotson et al.  SA Pension 
Funds 
5  66.2%  65.3% 
25  94.1%  96.2% 
50  90.7%  97.4% 
75  94.7%  98.5% 
95  97.2%  98.9% 
Table 1:  Comparison of Time-Series  
Regression studies 
Table 2:  Range of Time-Series Regression 
values 
* Global Balanced Assuming that each fund manager were to 
conform to the benchmark portfolio, the  R2 
would be 1. In other words, whilst the bench-
marks would differ there would be no difference 
in the implementation of each benchmark port-
folio. As active managers position the portfo-
lio’s away from the benchmark, the cross sec-
tional R2 decreases to the average of 0.43. At 
this point only 43% of the actual returns 
achieved are explained by similarities in invest-




uestion 3  looks to assess the pro-
portion of each fund’s total return 
that is explained by that fund’s 
benchmark return. The calculation 
is simply the ratio of BRi, / TRi. This ratio 
amounts to a measure of the degree to which 
value is added  where ,TRi > BRi  and con-
versely where value is destroyed through BRi, > 
TRi. Looked at from a different perspective, any 
fund that performs exactly in line with its bench-
mark return would have a ratio of 1. Any fund 
that generates returns in excess of the bench-
mark would have a ratio of < 1. This difference 
is the result of a combination of the asset allo-
cation decision, the sector and stock selection 
decision and market timing. The only way to 
break down the source of each alpha compo-
nent would be to perform an attribution analy-
sis, which data is unavailable. 
 
The data in table 3 sets out the results of our 
analysis and compares this with the previous 
international studies mentioned. As can be 
seen from both the Brinson & Ibbotson studies, 
the benchmark portfolio comprised a significant 
proportion of overall fund return. For the do-
mestic pension fund industry the benchmark 
portfolio explained 94% of total fund returns 
which translates into an average level of active 
return in excess of the benchmark of 2% over 
the 3 year period. The median level of active 
return was 0.7% per annum before the deduc-
tion of asset management fees. Taking fees 
into account the level of median return in ex-
cess of benchmark would approach 0. 
 
 
Clearly, as with the answer to question 1, all 
funds are not managed equally and not all 
managers are equal. Table 4 clearly sets out 
the difference between those funds that follow 
an active stance and those that tilt around a 
benchmark. In general just under half of the 
funds within the domestic pension fund industry 
are managed so closely to their respective 
benchmarks that they are indistinguishable 
from the benchmark. Net of costs these funds 
and the fund managers who manage them tend 
to produce a level of investment return that is 
less than the benchmark return. Funds, under 
this scenario, would be better off by simply 
investing in the benchmark.  
 
 
Assuming then that selected asset managers 
are able to add active returns, the final question 
that needed to be answered is that of quantify-
ing the level of active returns and the consis-
tency with which they are generated. 
Figure 2:  Fund vs Policy (Benchmark)  Returns:   
5 Year Annual Compound Returns to Dec 2001 
Figure 3:  Degree of Active Management vs Cross Sectional R2:   
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  Average 
Brinson 1986  112% 
Brinson 1991  101% 
Ibbotson et al. 2000  99% 
Domestic Pension Funds 
2001 
94% 
Table 3: Average Percentage of Total Return 
explained by Benchmark Return 




5  86%  69% 
25  96%  86% 
50  99%  97% 
75  102%  105% 
95  113%  114% 
Table 4:   Average Range of Total Return 







                          
0.60                2.5  
Manager B 
                          
0.97                3.2  
Manager C 
                          
0.90                5.0  
Manager D 
                          
1.08                5.2  
Manager E 
                          
1.03                5.7  
Manager F 
                          
1.01                6.2  
Manager G 
                          
0.97                6.5  
Manager H 
                          
0.97                6.7  
Manager I 
                          
1.05                6.7  
Manager J 
                          
1.02                7.5  
Table 5:  Active Management vs Consis-
tency of Active Returns 
In order to address this we looked at the posi-
tion of each manager over each of the 6 calen-
dar years since 1996 and compared this to 
each managers degree of active management. 
The results were consistent with the analysis to 
date and are presented in table 5. 
Manager A is very active with only 60% of the 
total returns generated (TRi) attributable to 
benchmark returns (BRi) . The interesting point 
in this regard is that manager A has also 
achieved a very high level of consistency in 
survey positioning. Manager B, whilst not 
nearly as active has succeeded in achieving a 
consistent ranking relative to other managers in 
the sample group. Manager C has been more 
active than B but has not achieved results 
consistently as evidence from the average 
ranking of each of the 5 yearly periods of  5.2 
 
Most other managers have either performed in 
line with what the benchmarks would have 
generated or have returned less value to their 
clients than the benchmark fund would have 
with a significant bias towards periods of poor 
relative performance. 
 
The results obtained by Ibbotson et al. and as 
pointed out in that particular study are consis-
tent with the observation made by Sharpe 
(1991). Sharpe observed that because the 
aggregation of all investors is the market, the 
average performance before costs of all inves-
tors must equal the market. 
 
This observation does not for a moment sug-
gest that active management can not add 
value. What is does suggest, and very strongly 
so, is that active returns through stock selection 
are much more difficult to achieve than is gen-
erally accepted. In dimentionalising this aspect 
of active returns we lastly looked at the likeli-
hood of fund managers being able to outper-
form the median return. The results are pre-
sented figure 4. 
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Figure 4:  Probability of Fund Manager’s A—J Outperforming the Industry Median Fund 
Out of the 10 managers surveyed only 3 dem-
onstrated the ability to outperform the median 
return on a consistent monthly basis. 
 
What should the industry focus on 
going forward? 
It is our view that in order for a pension fund to 
address the proposed changes to Reg 28 as 
well as serve the interests of members some 
changes need to be considered in light of the 
way pension funds are currently managed. 
These changes would seek to combine the 
disciplines of quantitative and active manage-
ment in order to create a defined and disci-
plined framework within which consultants and 
trustees can make an informed choice. 
 
The proposed framework is as follows: 
•  establish an appropriate fund structure 
focussing on both risk and return pa-
rameters within the framework of each 
clients specific needs (i.e the policy or 
benchmark portfolio) 
•  dependent on the type of benchmark 
portfolio formulated define the most ap-
propriate combination of fund manage-
ment styles.  
•  Use active managers to add value in 
terms of their stated areas of expertise 
and allow them to take  more defined 
bets within agreed tracking error limits. 
•  Use quantitative asset managers to de-
velop both the strategic and tactical asset 
allocation framework for each fund focus-
sing on the appropriate benchmark com-
ponents. Consider using quantitative 
managers to manage enhanced core 
funds at a significantly lower cost to the 
fund. 